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Kern-Fuller: Doe v. Condon: Lawyers Beware - This Unauthorized-Practice-of-Law

DOE v. CONDON: LAWYERS BEWARE-TIns
UNAUTHORIZED-PRACTICE-OF-LAW CASE
MAY AFFECT YOU!
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the recent case Doe v. Condon,' the South Carolina Supreme Court
broadened its definition of the practice of law to include offering "legal
presentations for the [general] public."2 This ruling directly addressed nonlawyers'
activities.' However, Doe v. Condon raises the specter that lawyers giving seminars
for the purpose of soliciting new clients, or lawyers soliciting clients by providing
advice over the Internet, may be engaging in the practice of law; additionally, these
lawyers may form client relationships with those to whom they give advice. If the
court's rationale is applied this broadly, a lawyer may be exposed to unanticipated
ethical obligations as well as to claims of malpractice. Further, an attorney not
licensed in South Carolina who presents such a seminar could unwittingly engage
in the unauthorized practice of law.
In Doe v. Condon, a paralegal sought a declaratory judgment from the South
Carolina Supreme Court to determine whether his activities constituted the
unauthorized practice of law.4 The paralegal presented the court with three issues.
First, he asked whether a nonlawyer who conducts legal education seminars for the
general public without an attorney present engages in the unauthorized practice of
law.' Second, he inquired as to whether a nonlawyer who meets privately with
clients in a law office and who answers questions without an attorney illegally
practices law.6 Finally, he asked whether a law firm can share profits with a
paralegal based on the volume and types of cases handled.7 The court detenrined
that the first two scenarios constituted the practice of law in South Carolina and that
nonlawyers could not perform these tasks unless a supervising attorney was
present.' Further, the court held that the third scenario constituted prohibited fee
splitting between a lawyer and a nonlawyer.9

1. 341 S.C. 22, 532 S.E.2d 879 (2000).

2. Id. at 24, 532 S.E.2d at 881.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 24-25,532 S.E.2d at 880-81.

5. Id. at 25, 532 S.E.2d at 881.
6. Id.
7. Doe v. Condon, 341 S.C. at 25,532 S.E.2d at 881.
8. Id. at 27-28, 532 S.E.2d at 882-83.
9. Id. at 29, 532 S.E.2d at 883 (citing S.C. APP. Cr. R. 407, R. 5.4(a)(3)). This Comment does
not address the implications ofthe apparent inconsistency between the court's holding that "[t]his fee
arrangement directly violates Rule 5.4 of the Rules of Professional [C]onduct" and its simultaneous
assertion that "[n]onlawyer employees may certainly participate'in a compensation or retirementplan,
even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit sharing arrangement."' Id. at 29 & n.3,
532 S.E.2d at 883 & n.3 (quoting S.C. APP. Cr. R. 407, R. 5.4(a)(3)). For a further discussion of this
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The court held that the presentation of a legal seminar of the nature proposed
constituted the practice of law because the topic was extremely complex and would
undoubtedly elicit specific questions from the audience.'0 A review of previous
practice-of-law cases reveals the courts' struggle with competing policy
rationales-protection of the public balanced by the desire both for judicial
efficiency and for reasonable public access to the judicial system. " First, courts are
concerned about solicitations for the provision of legal services directed to a naive
public that may incorrectly perceive an attorney-client relationship.12 This concern
is heightened when a nonlawyer conducts the solicitation because a layperson may
not understand that the services bargained for are those of a nonlawyer, not a
licensed attorney. 3 Alternatively, when an attorney conducts the solicitation, a
citizen may believe that an attorney-client relationship has been formed and that the
attorney now acts as his lawyer. 4 However, courts have allowed nonlawyers to
perform certain legal acts when there is little chance ofpublic misunderstanding and
when the legal issues at stakes are neither important nor complex.'
Part II of this Comment provides the modem history of practice-of-law cases
and explores the competing policy concerns underlying practice-of-law cases. Part
III discusses the application of these cases' reasoning in addressing the issues raised
by public legal presentations and by forums open to the public, including the
provision of legal advice via the Internet. Part IV concludes by asserting that Doe
v. Condon's definition of the "practice of law" should be interpreted consistently
with the courts' mission to limit undesirable legal-services solicitation practices in
South Carolina.

issue, see In re Anonymous Member of the South CarolinaBar, 295 S.C. 25, 28, 367 S.E.2d 17, 18
(1988), which held that paying bonuses to investigators based on a percentage of legal fees generated
by the cases on which they worked violated the Code's fee-splitting provisions; see also In re Brown,
319 S.C. 342, 345, 347, 461 S.E.2d 385, 386-87 (1995) (holding that a compensation system which
provided bonuses to a paralegal based on the charges billed to a particular client was in essence a feesplitting arrangement expressly prohibited under Rule 5.4(a)(3)).Butsee S.C. BarEthics Adv. Comm.,
Formal Op. 2 (1997) (stating that "[u]nder Rule 5.4(a)(3) of [t]he Rules of Professional Conduct, a
lawyer or law firm may institute a paralegal bonus system that bases the amount of a bonus on the
amount billed to clients, provided that the amounts billed to clients are reasonable under Rule 1.5").
10. Doe v. Condon, 341 S.C. at 27-28, 532 S.E.2d at 882.
11. See infra Part II.

12. Doe v. Condon, 341 S.C. at 26, 532 S.E.2d at 881 ("The line between what is and what is
not permissible conduct by a non-attorney is oftentimes 'unclear' and is a potential trap for the
unsuspecting client.").
13. Id. at 27, 532 S.E.2d at 882.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part II.
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF AND RATIONALEUNDERLYING THE MODERN DEFIMTION OF
PRACTICE OF LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA
.4. IntroductoryObservations

South Carolina limits the practice of law to licensed attorneys.' Courts enforce
this limit because "[t]he protection of the public so demands."' 7 However, "courts
have been historically hesitant in defining broadly what constitutes the practice of
law."' 8 What actually comprises the practice of law is fact intensive and fluid
depending on the individual circumstances in each case.'
Historically, the practice of law was not statutorily defined in South Carolina.2"
The South Carolina Supreme Court defined the concept in a 1909 case as follows:
[T]he practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
courts.... [I]t embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings, . . . the

management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts,... conveyancing, the preparation of

legal instruments of all kinds, and, in general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law.2
Decisions since 1909 have offered little more specificity. In defining the practice
of law, the supreme court has essentially adopted a case-by-case approach, looking
to the character of the acts performed in the context of individual cases.'
Recognizing the often unclear line between proper and improper conduct by
nonlawyers, the supreme court remains
convinced... that it is neither practicable nor wise to attempt a
comprehensive definition by way of a set of rules. Instead, [the
court believes] that the better course is to decide what is and what
is not the unauthorized practice of law in the context of an actual
case or controversy. 23

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-3 10 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & West Supp. 1999).
In re Lexington County Transfer Court, 334 S.C. 47, 50, 512 S.E.2d 791, 792 (1999).
Id. at 50-51, 512 S.E.2d at 792.
Id. at 51, 512 S.E.2d at 792-93.
State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells, 191 S.C. 468, 473, 5 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1939).
In re Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 189,65 S.E. 210,211 (1909).
Wells, 191 S.C. at 475, 5 S.E.2d at 184.
In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 309 S.C. 304,305, 422 S.E.2d 123, 124 (1992).
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However, the supreme court's ongoing struggle to define this amorphous concept
has led to the emergence of a two-fold rationale that enables the court to weigh the
competing policy concerns implicated in unauthorized-practice-of-law cases.
B. Protectionof a Naive Public
A review of unauthorized-practice-of-law cases reveals the South Carolina
Supreme Court's focus on the public's welfare. In State v. Buyers Service Co., the
court sent a clear message to nonlawyers, including nonlawyer corporations, that
the closing of real estate transactions constituted the practice of law.' Buyers
Service was a commercial title service corporation which "assist[ed] homeowners
in purchasing residential real estate."' The State alleged that Buyers Service
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by: (1) providing
reports, opinions or certificates as to the status of titles to real
estate and mortgage liens; (2) preparing documents affecting title
to real property; (3) handling real estate closings; (4) recording
legal documents at the courthouse; and (5) advertising to the
public that it [could] handle conveyancing and real estate
closings.26
The court held that each of these activities constituted the practice of law." Though
it did not specifically focus on the advertisement angle, the court noted its concern
for the public's protection at least four separate times within the opinion."
The supreme court's next attempt to define the practice of law came in 1995
with the case of State v. Despain.29 Lovella Despain, a nonlawyer, used a computer
program to assist individuals in preparing family court documents. 0 However,
instead of simply providing the program or blank legal forms, Despain completed
the forms for the individuals.3 ' As in Buyers Service Co., the court reasoned that
prohibiting Despain's actions would protect the public.32 Furthermore, the court was
concerned by Despain's advertisement in the newspaper under the "Legal Services"
category. 33

24. State v. Buyers Serv. Co., 292 S.C. 426, 434, 357 S.E.2d 15, 19 (1987).
25. Id. at 428, 357 S.E.2d at 16.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 430-34, 357 S.E.2d at 17-19.
28. Id. at 431-34, 357 S.E.2d at 18-19.
29. 319 S.C. 317,460 S.E.2d 576 (1995).
30. Id. at 319, 460 S.E.2d at 577.
31. Id. The court noted that "the sale or lease ofbooks or computer software simply containing
blank legal forms is not the practice of law." Id. at 320 n.2, 460 S.E.2d at 578 n.2.
32. Id. at 320, 460 S.E.2d at 578.
33. Id. at 319 n.1,460 S.E.2d at577 n.l.
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In State v. Robinson, a 1996 case, the court again addressed the advertisement
and provision of legal services by a nonlawyer3 4 Robinson was a paralegal and a
civil rights activist who lived in Anderson, South Carolina.35 He maintained an ad
in the local yellow pages under the heading of "Paralegals" that read: "Robinson
Melvin J.: 'IF YOUR CIVIL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED-CALL
ME.' ' ', 6 Robinson relied on a state law, South Carolina Code § 40-5-80, which
allows nonlawyers to prosecute the cause of another with leave of the court.37
However, the court found that Robinson prepared pleadings and gave advice to
individuals before obtaining the requisite permission; thus, it enjoined Robinson
"from preparing and filing legal documents and giving legal advice unless he first
obtain[ed] leave of court pursuant to § 40-5-80."' " Additionally, the court held that
Robinson's yellow page advertisement, business cards, and letterhead were
misleading "since his work product [was] admittedly not subject to the supervision
of a licensed attorney."39
As the South Carolina Supreme Court took an increasingly critical view of the
unauthorized practice of law, the legislature responded by increasing the statutory
penalty for such practice from a five hundred dollar fine per case solicited4 ° to a
felony which entails a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or imprisonment
of not more than five years, or both.4' Thus, the trend in both common and statutory
law is toward a heightened scrutiny of solicitation for legal services. Because the
public is ignorant of the differences between licensed legal practitioners, paralegals,
and corporations that offer legal services, the court has held that
[t]he practice of law is not confined to litigation, but extends
to activities in other fields which entail specialized legal
knowledge and ability. Often, the line between such activities and
permissible business conduct by non-attorneys is unclear ...
The reason preparation of instruments by lay persons must be
held to constitute the unauthorized practice of law is not for the
economic protection of the legal profession. Rather, it is for the
protection ofthe public from the potentially severe economic and

34. State v. Robinson, 321 S.C. 286,468 S.E.2d 290 (1996).
35. Id. at 288, 468 S.E.2d at 290.
36. Id. at 288, 468 S.E.2d at 291.
37. Id. at 288,468 S.E.2d at 290 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-80 (Law. Co-op. 1976), which
provides that a citizen may prosecute or defend the cause of another if he first obtains leave of the
court, provided that he gives an oath affirming that he has not and will not take any fee, gratuity, or
reward relating to the representation.).
38. Id. at 290, 468 S.E.2d at 292.
39. Id. at 289, 468 S.E.2d at 291.
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-310 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
41. Id. § 40-5-3 10 (West Supp. 1999).
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emotional consequences which may flow
from erroneous advice
42
given by persons untrained in the law.
C. Promotion ofEfficiency and PublicAccess to the Courts
When there is no chance of public misunderstanding about the nature of the
services provided, and the legal issues at stake are neither important or complex, the
South Carolina Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to permit nonlawyers to
perform certain law-related activities. In 1972, the court held that Highway Patrol
Officers could represent the State in the prosecution of misdemeanor traffic
violations.43 In 1978, the court expanded its holding to allow supervisory Highway
Patrol officers to assist an arresting officer in prosecuting these misdemeanor
violations.' The court reasoned as follows:
When the officers of the Highway Patrol present
misdemeanor traffic violations in the magistrates' courts, whether
as the arresting officer or a supervisory officer assisting the
arresting officer, they do so in their official capacities as law
enforcement officers and employees of the State. These officers
do not hold themselves out to the public as attorneys, and their
activity in the magistrates' courts does not jeopardize the public
by placing "incompetent and unlearned individuals in the practice
of law." To the contrary, this activity renders an important service
to the public by promoting the prompt and efficient administration
ofjustice.45
In 1991, the South Carolina Bar, via a special Unauthorized Practice of Law
subcommittee, submitted a set of proposed rules governing the unauthorized
practice of law to the South Carolina Supreme Court.46 The subcommittee
developed this detailed and comprehensive set of rules after thirteen years of
collecting information and an entire year of drafting the rules.47 With these rules,
the subcommittee "attempt[ed] to define and delineate the practice of law, and to
establish clear guidelines so that professionals other than attorneys [could] ensure
they [did] not inadvertently engage in the practice of law. ' 48 Ultimately, although

42. State v. Buyers Serv. Co., 292 S.C. 426, 430-31,357 S.E.2d 14, 17-18 (1987).
43. State v. Messervy, 258 S.C. 110, 113, 187 S.E.2d 524, 525 (1972).
44. State ex rel. McLeod v. Seaborn, 270 S.C. 696, 699, 244 S.E.2d 317, 319 (1978).
45. Id. at 698-99, 244 S.E.2d at 319 (quoting State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells, 191 S.C. 468, 481,
S.E.2d 181, 186 (1939)) (citation omitted). However, Seaborn's rationale does not spill over into
criminal cases prosecuted in magistrates' and municipal courts. See, e.g., In re Lexington County
Transfer Court, 334 S.C. 47,52-53,512 S.E.2d 791,793-94 (1999) (holding that nonlawyers may not
represent the State in criminal plea negotiations or in transfer-court guilty plea proceedings).
46. In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 309 S.C. 304,305,422 S.E.2d 123, 124 (1992).
47. Id.
48. Id.
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the court "commend[ed] the subcommittee for its Herculean efforts to define the
practice of law," it rejected the detailed guidelines.49
Despite its refusal to adopt the proposed rules, the court chose "to clarify
certain practices which... [did] not constitute the unauthorized practice of law."5
In clarifying its position, the court made two new declarations regarding
nonlawyers' ability to provide law-related services for monetary compensation.
First, the Court overruled State ex rel. Danielv. Wells to the extent that it prohibited
nonlawyers from representing business entities."' In modifying the rule of Wells, the
court chose to "allow a business to be represented by a nonlawyer officer, agent or
employee, including attorneys licensed in other jurisdictions . . ., in civil
magistrate's court proceedings."' The second, more notable change was the court's
creation of a special exception for Certified Public Accountants. 3 The Court noted
that
our respect for the rigorous professional training, certification and
licensing procedures, continuing education requirements, and
ethical code required of Certified Public Accountants (CPAs)
convinces us that they are entitled to recognition of their unique
status.... We are confident that allowing CPAs to practice in
their areas of expertise, subject to their own professional
regulation,
will best serve to both protect and promote the public
54
interest.
However, the court later limited the extent to which it was willing to relax the
rules regarding nonlawyers' representation of business entities. In 1999, the court
addressed the issue of whether a corporate officer could represent the entity in a
circuit court or a court of appeals; the supreme court was unwilling to allow such
representation in courts of record, where the stakes were much higher than in
magistrates' courts.5" This holding appears to reflect the court's view that the value
of allowing limited representation in magistrates' courts exceeds the potential costs
to the client if errors should occur. 6 By contrast, where the costs of incompetent or
unethical representation might be substantially higher, such as in circuit courts or
courts of appeals, the court will not permit nonlawyers to act as legal
representatives for business entities. 7

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 309 S.C. at 305-06, 422 S.E.2d at 124.
Id. at 306, 422 S.E.2d at 124.
Id. at 306,422 S.E.2d at 124-25.

54. Id.
55. Renaissance Enters., Inc. v. Summit Teleservices, Inc., 334 S.C. 649, 652-53, 515 S.E.2d
257, 258-59 (1999).
56. See id.
57. Id.
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The common theme underlying these exceptions is that there are no solicitation
issues and there is little chance of the public being misled as to the character or
quality of the services provided. In such cases, the promotion of efficiency and
increased public access to the court system overrides concerns that the public will
be unduly harmed by nonlawyers' practicing law.
III. APPLYING DOE V. CONDON TO FUTURE CASES
A.

General Observations

In Doe v. Condon, the court prohibited a paralegal from conducting a seminar
for the public on the ground that he would be engaging in the unauthorized practice
of law. 8 By doing so, the court not only set new, clear limits on the performance
of law-related activities by nonlawyers, but it also may have implicitly expanded
the responsibilities of lawyers who offer legal-education seminars or advice over
the Internet. The court expressed its concern that given the high degree of
specialized knowledge required to provide accurate answers regarding various types
of trusts, questions which could not be answered without practicing law would arise
in the course of the seminar.5 9 However, ifa nonlawyer giving a seminar constitutes
the practice of law, does it follow that a lawyer who offers a similar presentation is
also practicing law and creating attorney-client relationships with those in
attendance?6

58. Doe v. Condon, 341 S.C. 22, 24, 532 S.E.2d 879, 881 (2000).
59. Id. at 27-28, 531 S.E.2d at 882.
60. This question raises the concern that the court might follow otherjurisdictions which focus
on the potential client's intent when seeking advice from the attorney to determine whether an
attorney-client relationship has been formed. See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client
Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the Promise, 49 DuKE L.J. 147, 183 n. 116 (1999)
(discussing various authorities which support the notion that a putative client may rely on advice
tailored to his particular question); see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d
1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting that the privileges of the attorney-client relationship are based on
the client's intention to obtain legal advice and on his belief that he is consulting a lawyer for that
purpose); Keoseian v. Von Kaulbach, 707 F. Supp. 150, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("In every situation
where an attorney-client relationship has been found .... the client's belief has some reasonable basis
in fact in that he has some interest of his own or in common with others which he is seeking to
advance by securing legal advice."); Alexander v. Superior Court, 685 P.2d 1309, 1314 (Ariz. 1984)
(noting that a client's reasonable belief that an attorney-client relationship existed is an important
factor in the court's evaluation of the relationship); Foulke v. Knuck, 784 P.2d 723, 726 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1989) (considering the client's belief that he is seeking and receiving legal advice regarding a
specific matter); In re Lieber, 442 A.2d 153, 156 (D.C. 1982) (considering the client's perception of
an attorney as retained legal counsel as a factor in determining whether an attorney-client relationship
exists); George v. Caton, 600 P.2d 822, 827 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (finding that an attorney-client
relationship existed even absent a formal contract because the attorneys had failed in their
responsibility to be clear enough to avoid the client's misunderstanding the relationship); In reGalton,
615 P.2d 317, 325 (Or. 1980) (holding that a lawyer who furnished legal advice free of charge to a
corporation that occasionally called seeking advice could be considered an attorney for the
corporation, because a lawyer not on retainer "[may] be considered an attorney for a client who, from
time to time, calls that lawyer seeking legal advice and receives such advice as a matter of course");
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In the past decade, the South Carolina Bar has issued several ethics advisory
opinions addressing the offering of legal seminars 6' and, more recently, the
provision of legal advice over the Interet.62 In Advisory Opinion 90-37, the Ethics
Committee opined that a lawyer could furnish general legal information to members
of the public through educational seminars, provided the information furnished did
not contain any false or misleading information.' Similarly, in Advisory Opinion
91-04, the committee stated that providing general legal information to the public
did not constitute the practice of law."
B. Legal PresentationPerils
The implications of Doe v. Condonare significant for lawyers because they are
often asked to present seminars to various groups about topics in their particular
area of concentration. 65 For instance, a nationally-renowned civil rights attorney
might be asked to address a local group about practices the attorney has challenged
elsewhere. While making such a presentation, an attorney will likely be asked
specific questions regarding suspect practices in that locale. 6 Would answering
specific legal questions be considered the unauthorized practice of law if the
presenter were not a member of the South Carolina Bar? Alternatively, if the
presenter were a member of this Bar, would answering a fact-specific question form
an attorney-client relationship with the questioner?
Interpreting Doe v. Condon broadly to denominate such activities as the
practice of law may not be appropriate or consistent with the South Carolina
Supreme Court's rationale in previous cases. 67 The court clearly expressed its

Intercapital Corp. of Or. v. Intercapital Corp. of Wash., 700 P.2d 1213, 1215-16 (Wash. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that a consultation, coupled with the putative client's view that the attorney was being
retained to represent him, was enough to establish an attorney-client relationship); Developments in
theLaw-ConflictsofInterest in theLegalProfession,94 HARV.L.REv. 1244, 1322 (1981) ("The focus
on the client's perspective, rather than on the sometimes misleading external indicia of the objective
approach, safeguards an individual's belief and reliance.").
61. See, e.g., S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 37 (1990) (discussing a law firm's
advertising efforts conducted in conjunction with its provision of legal seminars); see also Formal Op.
4 (1991) (criticizing a plan which involved the formation of an organization comprised of both
lawyers and nonlawyers to disseminate tax and estate planning information to the public for an annual
fee).
62. See,e.g.,
S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op.27 (1994)(noting that the "practice of
law via electronic media creates several issues that may violate the South Carolina Rules of
Professional Conduct"); see also Formal Op. 8 (1997) (discussing the confidentiality of client
communications transmitted via electronic mail).
63. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 37 (1990).
64. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 4 (1991); see also Formal Op. 27 (1994) (stating
that "[o]ther jurisdictions have similarly recognized that the participation in educational seminars,
newspaper columns, and radio shows for members of the public generally, which do not provide
specific legal advice to individuals, [is] permissible).
65. See supraPart M.A.
66. See S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 4 (1991).
67. See supra Part II.
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concern that the purpose of the "educational seminar" at issue was to solicit
business, and such solicitation may have been the crux of the court's disapproval." s
Consequently, the determination of whether an attorney-client relationship has been
formed through advice given at a public presentation may turn on two factors. First,
the court will likely evaluate whether the attorney was offering the seminar or
presentation as an attempt to solicit business. Solicitation was a crucial element in
many earlier unauthorized-practice-of-law cases.69 Next, the court might analyze
how specialized or personalized the advice given to the attendee was and what
expectations the attendee had when receiving the advice.7" If the lawyer's purpose
in making the presentation was to provide a public service by addressing a nonprofit
group on a topic of political or community concern, the court might find that an
attorney-client relationship was not formed with the attendees.7 However, if the
attorney answered specific questions about an intricate or individualized set of facts,
he might well be providing legal advice and engaging in the practice of law.72 Such
practice could have malpractice and conflict of interest implications.73

In making its determination, the court will likely focus on the presenter's
motives. If the presenter seeks to disseminate his political beliefs, rather than to
derive a pecuniary gain, the court may find that the presentation does not constitute
the practice of law.74 However, after Doe v. Condon, attorneys risk forming an
attorney-client relationship if a layperson asks them individualized questions and
believes that they intend to give him specific legal advice.7"
C. Application to Internet Advice
Accompanying the growth of legal-education seminars is the ever-increasing
proliferation of law firms on the Internet. 76 Since placing a law firm's web page in
"cyberspace" allows international access to the firm, many issues regarding the
practice of law can arise. The effect of Doe v. Condon on the common practice of
responding to legal questions from nonclients via e-mail or some other electronic
forum has yet to be tested.77

68. Doe v. Condon, 341 S.C. 22, 29, 532 S.E.2d 879, 883 (2000).

69. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 62.
71. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,422 (1978) (determining that an attorney did not violate the
disciplinary rules when "her actions were undertaken to express personal political beliefs and to
advance the civil-liberties objectives of the ACLU, rather than to derive financial gain").
72. Doe v. Condon, 341 S.C. at 27, 532 S.E.2d at 882.
73. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.

76. See, e.g., Finkel & Altman, LLC, at http://finkellaw.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2002); Foster
& Foster, L.L.P., at http://www.fosterfoster.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2002); Haynesworth Sinkler
Boyd, P.A., at http://www.sinklerboyd.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2002); Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough, L.L.P., at http://www.nmrs.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2002); see infra note 79.
77. For a comprehensive analysis of the ethical and legal obligations of providing legal advice
via the Internet and other media, see Lanctot, supra note 60, at 218-47.
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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

The South Carolina Bar Association quickly recognized the potential perils
awaiting lawyers who advertised on the Internet. In 1994, the Bar's Ethics
Committee opined as follows:
Since a public advertisement on electronic media is necessarily
available to a universal audience, the attorney will be placing
advertising designed to reach potential clients in jurisdictions in
which he is not admitted to practice. Under Rule 7.2(a), any
notice or advertisement disseminated [in the] public media must
clearly identify the geographic limitations of the lawyer's practice,
so that it is clear that he may not practice law except in those
states in which is he admitted to practice. Otherwise, the
advertisement will "omit[] a fact necessary to make the statement
considered as a whole not materially misleading" [in violation of]
Rule 7.1 (a).7"
The purpose of the attorney's web presence is likely much different than that
of a public-interest legal presentation. Many firms now maintain a web site to
attract new clients and to maintain current ones.7 9 "To the extent that the attorney
maintains a presence on electronic media solely for the purpose of discussing legal
topics generally, without the giving ofadvice or the representation ofany particular
client, this practice [is permissable]." 0 However, if an attorney gives specific
advice regarding a particular set offacts, he may be engaging in the practice of law
and forming an attorney-client relationship with his questioner.8 ' In such a situation,
heightened duties may attach, and the attorney may be exposed to claims of
malpractice, conflict of interest, and breach of client confidentiality. For example,
assume that "[t]here exists information that a prudent attorney would be hesitant to
discuss by facsimile, telephone, or regular mail."8'2 Information this sensitive may
require heightened Internet security, including "such options as encryption in order
to safeguard against even inadvertent disclosure of [such] information when using
e-mail. 8 3

78. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 2 7 (1994) (quoting S.C.App. Cr.R. 407, R. 7.1(a))
(alteration in original).
79. See Herman J. Russomanno, The FloridaBar's CuttingEdge Technology to Help Florida
Lawyers, FLA. B.L 6,8 (2000) (reporting that "[a]ccording to surveys conducted by the Chicago-Kent
College of Law, since 1992 Internet use in law firms has risen significantly, from five percent to 78
percent").
80. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 27 (1994).
81. See supra Part .B.
82. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 8 (1997).
83. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The South Carolina Supreme Court's definition of what constitutes the practice
of law in Doe v. Condon should not be interpreted literally so as to create an
attorney-client relationship every time a lawyer presents a general-information
seminar or posts generic legal information on an Internet forum or web site.'
However, unless the court clarifies its holding, lawyers who provide highly
specialized legal seminars or who offer specific information in response to
particular legal questions may find that they have opened a "Pandora's Box" of
legal and ethical obligations. Without further guidance from the court, lawyers
would be wise not to address specific questions when presenting legal-education
seminars or when posting legal information on the Internet. If the lawyer's intention
is to solicit business through one of these mediums, then he should conduct the
usual consultation with the potential client so the proper conflict of interest checks
can be performed and appropriate records regarding the meeting can be created.
Candy M. Kern-Fuller

84. A wise jurist once opined that "[m]uch of the misunderstanding abroad in the world can be
attributed to literal thinking." Southern Bell v. S.C. Tax Conu'n, 297 S.C. 492,495,377 S.E.2d 358,
360 (Ct. App. 1989) (Sanders, C.J.)
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